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Abstract
This paper examines the question of why some states impose tolls while others rely more
heavily on fuel and other taxes.A model to predict the share of street and highway revenue
from tolls is estimated as a function of the share of non-resident workers, the policies of
neighbouring states, historical factors, and population. The more non-resident workers,
the greater the likelihood of tolling, after controlling for the miles of toll road planned or
constructed before the 1956 Interstate Act. Similarly if a state exports a number of
residents to work out-of-stateand thoseneighbouringstatestoll, it will be likely to retaliate
by imposing its own tolls. Decentralisation of finance and control of the road network
from the federal to the state, metropolitan, and city and county levels of government will
increase the incentives for the highway-managing jurisdiction to impose tolls.
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223Introduction
Interest in road pricing to ® nance infrastructure, mitigate congestion, and
improve air quality has been rising at a regular pace over recent years
(Small et al., 1989; TRB 1994; Roth 1996). States have the opportunity to
impose toll ® nancing on many of their bridges and highways and to
determine the rate of toll, recognising the legal and ® scal constraints
imposed by accepting federal transport funds. Yet not all states levy tolls,
and those that do vary in the rate of toll. This paper examines empirical
evidence to explain the dependence of state highway ® nance on tolls,
extending theoretical work by the author (Levinson, 1998a,1999).
While the use of tolls to manage the externalities of congestion and
pollution is relatively new in the realm of highways, road pricing to build
and maintain infrastructure has a long history (Levinson, 1998b). Road
tolls, present since ancient times, were deployed widely in the eighteenth
century. By the middle of the nineteenth century, most intercity land travel
in Britain and the United States used turnpikes. Yet at the onset of the
twentieth century and soon thereafter almost all tollgates had been dis-
banded and the turnpikes converted to publicly owned, publicly operated,
free highways. Disturnpiking occurred simultaneously with the cen-
tralisation of control over roadsÐ management moved from small local
agencies, companies, and authorities to larger regions or states. Longer-
distance travel was viewed as a responsibility of a higher level of gov-
ernment, which saw more users as local residents. What is non-local to a
county may be local to a state. By the 1940s the desire for limited-access
highways serving long-distance auto trips led to another upsurge in toll
road construction by states. The 1956 Federal Aid Highway Act arrested
this trend by guaranteeing federal funding for a designated interstate
highway system free of tolls. Just as before, what is non-local to a state is
local to the nation. Thus, the vast majority of intercity roads in the United
States constructed in the interstate era are not tolled because of centralised
national policy-making. Recent interest in tolls in the United States has
increased with the completion of the interstate highway programme. New
road ® nancing has largely become a state and local problem again.
Because of the reduction in the transactions costs to government and
travellers with electronic toll collection, tolls are more widely viewed as a
feasible option. New public and even private toll roads are being con-
structed with electronic toll collection, while existing toll plazas are being
converted.
The term ``beggar-thy-neighbour’’ describes strategic trade behaviour,
essentially mercantilist in nature, designed to give one country a foreign
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1 Inevitably, such behaviour leads
to retaliation and only makes everyone worse oŒ . Countries perceive what
game theorists term a ``prisoner’s dilemma,’’ whereby ``cooperating’’ to
reduce barriers only pays oŒin the long term and only if others recipro-
cate. Highway tolls are in some ways analogous to tariŒ s. States (or the
turnpike authorities they establish) can charge travellers crossing a
boundary. For many facilities, no similar charge is levied on tra￿ c
remaining within the boundary. In this way, a toll may be viewed as a
tariŒon the transport portion of a good or on labour. Overall, states and
users may be better oŒif other ® nancing mechanisms, such as fuel taxes,
with signi® cantly lower transactions costs are chosen. However, the
inability of states to cooperate and compensate each other for their resi-
dents’ travel on other states’ roads leads to a more direct and costly toll
system. When most users are in-state residents, a legislature can develop a
reasonably practical cost-sharing solution for highway ® nance. That is not
nearly so simple when states need to cooperate. While the extent to which
the behaviour of tolling roads is to achieve e￿ ciencies, and the extent to
which it is price discrimination, cannot be established a priori, we can
surmise that one state’s perception of e￿ cient ® nancing may be perceived
by another as discriminatory exploitation.
TariŒ s and tolls diŒ er in several important respects. First, tolls may be
seen as e￿ cient user charges as states provide a service in exchange for
payment of a toll. Second, because of the nature of surface transport, the
toll may aŒ ect ``through trips’’, travel conducted between two other states.
Third, the presence of externalities, particularly congestion, may make it
socially bene® cial to use tolls rather than other sources of revenue (Wal-
ters, 1961; Vickery, 1963). To date this use of tolls has been much more
promise than practice.
While road tolls diŒ er from tariŒ s, this paper argues ``beggar-thy-
neighbour’’ policies help explain their extent. For states that import a
signi® cant number of workers during the workday, tolls may seem an ideal
way to raise revenue with little political implications. Because out-of-state
residents cannot vote in a state’s election, toll policies will be more pre-
valent in states that import labour, as it enables them to raiserevenue from
non-voters. While complicated, the economics suggest that there will be
some eŒ ects (both positive and negative) on local residents of tolls assessed
1Beggar-Thy-Neighbour PolicyÐ ``A course of action through which a country tries to
reduce unemploymentand increase domestic output by raising tariŒ s and institutingnon-
tariŒbarriers that impede imports which, by reducing export markets,tended to worsen
the economic di￿ culties that precipitated the initial protectionist action.’’ (Smith and
Blakeslee, 1998)
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Furthermore, a toll policy may provoke a retaliatory response by the
labour exporting states, but the response will be less than full force. In
labour exporting states, the burden of tolls (collection costs and so on)
falls disproportionately on residents. States with large shares of resident
workers (and thus fewer imported or exported labourers) are most likely
to rely on taxes.
This paper begins by an examination of the data used in the statistical
analyses. Then the speci® c hypotheses for the essential variables are pre-
sented accompanied with the results from a regression analysis. A sensi-
tivity analysis is conducted using California data to examine the possible
eŒ ect on share of toll revenue when states devolve the power to toll and
responsibility for roads to counties and to metropolitan areas. The main
diŒ erence is that the number of interstate trips is much smaller than inter-
county trips, so the incentive structure shifts. Finally the research is
summarised and some policy conclusions are drawn.
Data
Several sources of data are used in this analysis. Highway ® nance data
come from the Federal Highway Administration’s (1995) Highway
Finance tables, which provide information on total revenue by state, and
revenue by source, including tolls and other sources. Alaska is excluded,
because although that state’s data identify the ``Alaska Marine Highway’’
as a highway toll, the service is a ferry. The District of Columbia does not
have independent authority over its own roads, rather it faces veto from
Congress, and so it too is excluded. The remaining 49 states are included in
the analysis.
The Census Journey to Work survey (US Census 1998) is used to
develop state-to-state tra￿ c ¯ ows. The author developed a state-level trip
table from the journey to work data. This table provides the number of
work trips from each state by state of destination (in state or out of state).
It also provides the number of work trips to each state by state of origin,
not available from published data. The trip table can be used to determine
the level of interaction between states, so that the eŒ ects of neighbouring
states’ policies can be estimated.
To apply the model to geographic units smaller than states, and thus
test the implications of a policy for decentralising highway ® nance, Census
Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) were used. PUMAs are the
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(PUMS) data set. The Census constructs PUMAs such that they contain
approximately 100,000 people within them. They can be as small as a few
city blocks or as large as several counties. An exact description of PUMAs
is available from the University of Virginia Library Geospatial and Sta-
tistical Data Center (1998).
In preliminary analysis, the American Travel Survey (1995) was also
usedtoconstruct atriptableof long trips(greaterthan100miles).While the
journey to work survey focuses on short trips (though not the very short
non-work trips),it does not consider long trips,which mayhavesome eŒ ect
on policy. State level summaries from this trip table were also tested in the
regression models, but proved insigni® cant upon the inclusion of the jour-
ney to work data and so were excluded from the ® nal analysis. Several
special cases are thus missed, such as Florida, a major tourist destination,
which may have a special incentive to export road costs to visitors.
Data on land area and population by state (and thus density) were also
obtained from the Census Bureau. Historical data representing the miles
of toll road in operation in 1963 by state were obtained from Rae (1969).
A summary of state level data is provided in Table 1.
Hypotheses
This research hypothesises that states impose tolls to ensure a signi® cant
revenue ¯ ow from non-local travellers. Individuals pay income and
property taxes to the state in which they live, not necessarily where they
work or travel. Furthermore, because drivers can control where they
purchase gasoline, particularly for shorter trips, the fuel tax does not
guarantee revenue from non-resident travellers. Unfortunately, there is no
single systematic source of data about interstate trips. The American
Travel Survey captures long trips and the Census Journey to Work data
captures work trips, but short trips for non-work activities are not col-
lected in su￿ cient detail to measure interstate travel. Because most non-
work trips are shorter than most work trips, it seems reasonable to sup-
pose that interstate non-work trips are relatively small in number com-
pared with work trips. We might also suppose that the number of non-
work trips between states is proportional to work trips between those
states, though this cannot be corroborated with the available data. We
expect to see a positive and signi® cant relationship between the share of
non-resident workers (O) and the share of toll revenue (S).
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Summary Data
State Percentage Workers Who Residents Federal Miles Freeways
Revenue from Live Out of Who Work Land Toll Roads Expwy,
Tolls (S) State (O) Out of State in 1963 1995
Alabema 0.0 2.4 3.6 3.3 0 925
Arizona 0.0 1.1 1.6 41.5 0 1250
Arkansas 0.0 4.0 3.2 8.3 0 646
California 2.1 0.5 0.4 44.6 0 3750
Colorado 0.3 0.8 1.0 36.0 17 1170
Connecticut 0.0 4.6 4.7 0.2 194 542
Delaware 25.3 13.8 9.5 2.2 11 51
Florida 7.8 0.8 1.0 7.6 207 1861
Georgia 0.4 2.8 2.4 3.9 11 1413
Hawaii 0.0 1.0 0.5 8.5 0 77
Idaho 0.0 2.6 4.0 60.6 0 613
Illinois 9.3 2.8 2.9 1.3 185 2245
Indiana 4.3 3.3 4.8 1.7 157 1303
Iowa 0.1 3.7 4.3 0.2 0 781
Kansas 6.5 7.1 7.6 0.5 241 1008
Kentucky 0.8 6.3 6.7 4.2 205 855
Louisiana 2.9 2.1 1.9 2.8 0 929
Maine 10.5 2.1 3.1 0.9 112 383
Maryland 7.0 7.0 17.3 3.1 42 711
Massachusetts 10.4 5.0 3.1 1.2 124 762
Michigan 0.7 0.8 1.5 10.1 0 1458
Minnesota 0.0 2.3 1.8 3.1 0 1042
Mississippi 0.0 3.1 5.9 4.3 0 726
Missouri 0.1 7.2 4.8 3.8 0 1460
Montana 0.0 0.8 1.2 27.5 0 1190
Nebraska 0.2 4.3 2.3 1.2 0 497
Nevada 0.0 4.3 1.2 77.1 0 586
New Hampshire 11.8 8.5 16.8 12.8 77 266
New Jersey 27.3 7.0 11.7 3.3 309 728
New Mexico 0.0 1.9 2.5 33.9 0 1003
New York 33.2 5.1 2.4 0.7 629 2328
North Carolina 0.1 2.2 1.8 6.9 0 1237
North Dakota 0.0 5.9 3.7 4.0 0 570
Ohio 3.3 2.8 2.2 1.1 241 1937
Oklahoma 7.6 1.1 2.9 1.5 174 1064
Oregon 0.5 3.7 2.1 51.8 0 780
Pennsylvania 11.7 3.4 4.3 2.2 469 2087
Rhode Island 3.7 7.6 11.9 0.7 0 137
South Carolina 0.0 2.1 1.8 3.8 0 894
South Dakota 0.0 3.0 4.0 5.5 0 681
Tennessee 0.0 4.6 3.3 5.7 0 1176
Texas 2.5 0.9 0.8 1.4 30 4474
Utah 0.1 1.0 1.3 63.1 0 948
Vermont 0.0 4.9 5.8 6.4 0 1329
Virginia 4.7 6.5 9.3 9.4 35 339
Washington 4.1 1.5 2.7 24.1 0 1079
West Virginia 6.6 8.3 9.7 7.0 86 560
Wisconsin 0.0 1.4 3.2 5.3 0 830
Wyoming 0.0 2.6 2.0 48.5 0 916
Note: Toll Miles = Toll Miles in Use in 1963, from Rae (1971) after Bureau of Public Road data
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to other states. That state may respond by tolling in return to try to
recapture some of that revenue. However, a situation where both states
taxed instead of tolled could be better overall, especially for the labour-
exporting state. Therefore, the labour-exporter may be less likely to toll
initially Ð where initial tolls will bring about retaliatory tolls. If its labour-
importing neighbour taxes, the labour-exporting state may retain taxes as
well. In game theory terms, it will cooperate initially, and only be non-
cooperative if its neighbour is as well. The outcomes of alternatives are
illustrated in the following schematic:




It is unlikely that the eŒ ect of a neighbour’s tolls will be as strong as the
eŒ ect of non-local trips, because tolls in a labour exporting state will
disproportionately aŒ ect its own residents. (A labour importing state is in
a politically much better position to exploit its neighbours than a labour
exporting state.) Furthermore, only a fraction of its own residents will
travel out of state and pay tolls to their neighbours. So this can be thought
of as a second-order eŒ ect. It is hypothesised that the toll share will be
positively and signi® cantly aŒ ected by the tolls of neighbouring states. We
measure the neighbour tolls (N), as the share of revenue from tolls in each
neighbouring state weighted by the share of that state’s residents com-












Where: Ni ˆ Neighbour state eŒ ect for state i;
Tij ˆ Trips from state i to state j;
Wi ˆ
P
j Tij for all j;
Sj ˆ Share of revenue from tolls in state j;
b ˆ model coe￿ cient
Raising the term to a power greater than 1 magni® es larger interac-
tions, and reduces noise in the data. The value of b b ˆ 4 was arrived at
after some experimentation.
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their own limited access highways. As noted in the introduction, many of
these highways were toll ® nanced. Tolls capture out of state tra￿ c as well
as securing a source of funds against which an independent public
authority can borrow. Many of those roads are extant and still operated as
toll roads. Because of historical inertia, the share of toll revenue in 1995
still depends on the presence of toll roads from 40 years ago. Since the
dependent variable is a ratio, we construct this independent variable
similarly.To measure the eŒ ect of historical toll miles (M), we use the ratio
of toll miles in 1963 to miles of limited access highways in 1995. Toll miles
in 1963 re¯ ect linear miles of toll roads built or under construction before
the interstate programme took full force. Limited access highways in 1995
are measured as the linear miles of toll roads, interstate highways, and
other freeways and expressways. Revenue and miles are not directly
related Ð revenue depends also on the rate of toll and the use of the
facility, both of which are aŒ ected by the other variables described here.
Certainly the theory applies before 1956 as well, but data on interstate
trips from that era are unavailable to test.
The size of a jurisdiction may aŒ ect the share of revenue from tolls.
Jurisdictions that are more populous may have higher costs for building
and maintaining highways and more congestion. Furthermore, states
containing large cities may be more likely to import workers than rural
states. Finally, states in the Northeast and Midwest tend to be more
populous than the national average (recognising some obvious very
populous states in the south and west), and those states have less land area
than the average. Those states have many more miles of toll roads, because
of their early start building limited access highways. We expect that 1990
population (P) will be positively and signi® cantly associated with share of
toll revenue, but we will test it in combination with population density and
land area.
If states have higher costs, then they should have higher expenditures,
and may require more revenue from tolls (to avoid the losses caused by
fuel tax border eŒ ects). If population is important because of costs, then
expenditures may also be a signi® cant variable.
In the interstate act, interstate highways were ® nanced with a 90 per
cent federal share and a 10 per cent state share except in the so-called
``public lands’’ states. In those states up to 95 per cent federal ® nancing
was provided. Under the interstate act, federally funded roads had to be
free of tolls. This additional incentive to use federal dollars may be
apparent in today’s tolls share. A variable indicating the percentage of
land in a state that is federally owned was tested to capture this eŒ ect.
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To test the hypotheses, a series of regressions was run, with the dependent
variable being the share of state revenue from tolls. Other model struc-
tures, including binomial logit and probit models were tested (the choice of
toll/not toll) as was an aggregate logistic form, where the dependent
variable was S= 1 S . Subsamples of the tolling states were used in some
estimates, excluding from the share estimates states that don’t toll. Dif-
ferent functional forms (Cobb-Douglas) as well as non-linear transfor-
mations of the variables were tested. The linear speci® cation was preferred
because it was plausible and simple and the ® t was good. The Cook-
Weisberg test on an uncorrected ordinary least squares regression reports
heteroscedasticity, so corrected robust estimates using the Huber-White
estimator of variance are presented in Table 2.
Table 2
Dependent Variable: Share of Transportation
Revenue from Tolls
Model 1 Model 2
Coe￿ cients t Stat Coe￿ cients t Stat
Intercept 0.0343 1:91* 0:0362 2:18**
Population (P) (millions) 0.00383 1.83* 0.00385 1.94*
Mile Ratio (M) 0.300 2.34** 0.352 3.14***
Imported Workers (O) 0.843 2.04** 0.839 2.14**
Neighbour EŒ ect (N) 89320 1.70*
Adjusted R Square 0.62 0.60
Standard Error 0.04 0.05
Observations 49 49
F 20.87 25.76
Signi® cance F 0.00 0.00
Note: *, **, *** denotes signi® cance at 10%, 5%, 1% on two-tailed t-test respectively
Analysis of Variance for Model 1:H0: Y= Mean (Y)
DF Sum of Squares Mean of Squares
Model 4 0.1674 0.0419
Residuals 44 0.0882 0.0020
Total 48 0.2556
Source Type I SS Fisher’s F Pr.> F
Population (P) 0.0182 9.0680 0.0043
Mile Ratio (M) 0.1263 63.0004 0.0001
Imported Workers (O) 0.0171 8.5174 0.0055
Neighbour EŒ ect (N) 0.0058 2.9105 0.0951
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centage of federal lands variable turned out to be statistically insigni® cant,
and so was dropped from the ® nal analysis presented here. Similarly,
variables for capital and non-capital expenditures were tested as possible
explanatory variables and rejected as statistically insigni® cant. While land
is an important variable if the share of workers residing out of state (O) is
excluded, it is clearly the number of workers, rather than the less direct
estimate based on land area, which is signi® cant. Population and density
were tested, but density was dropped because population was a much
more important and signi® cant variable, and density was statistically
insigni® cant.
Model 1 was estimated was as follows:
S ˆ a0 a1O a2N a3M a4P 1
Where: S ˆ Share of Revenue from Tolls in 1995;
O ˆ Share of workers residing out of state in 1990;
N ˆ neighbouring states eŒ ect;
M ˆ ratio of miles of toll road in 1963 to all limited access
highways in 1995;
P ˆ 1990 population.
The regression corroborates the hypotheses concerning the eŒ ect of
population (P), out of state workers (O), the neighbour eŒ ect (N), and the
historical toll miles (M), which are all positive and signi® cant. As expected
the neighbour eŒ ect (N) was less signi® cant than the share of non-resident
workers (O). As shown in Table 2 (the results from the statistical analysis)
overall the model explains 62.4 per cent (adjusted r-squared) of the var-
iance in states share of highway revenue from tolls. In order of impor-
tance, the ratio of toll miles (M) explains 49.4 per cent, population
explains 7.1 per cent, out of state workers (O) explains 6.7 per cent and the
neighbour eŒ ect (N) explains 2.3 per cent of that variance. All four vari-
ables are statistically signi® cant at the 10 per cent threshold (2-tailed t
test).
Each 1 per cent increase in the share of non-resident workers (O)
increases the share of toll revenue (S) by 0.85 per cent on average. Each 1
per cent increase in the toll mile ratio (M) increases the S by 0.30 per cent.
Each additional million people increases S by 0.38 per cent. The eŒ ect of a
neighbour’s tolling policy on a state’s residents is more complicated
because of the non-linearity involved. To illustrate, if N ˆ 0:01 (for
example in Rhode Island N ˆ 0:011 , a 1 per cent increase in neighbours’
tolls causes S to increase by 0.0036 per cent. If N ˆ 0:02 (in New
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per cent, while if N ˆ 0:03 (in New Jersey N = 0.031),a 1 per cent increase
induces a 0.30 per cent increase in S.
Model 2 in Table 2 shows the regression results when we drop the eŒ ect
of neighbours (N). The results are quite similar. However, the implications
of the model diŒ er signi® cantly as seen in the next section, which applies
the model to metropolitan and county level data.
Sensitivity Analysis
Our model, estimated at the state level, suggests that more localised
control over highways will lead to a greater likelihood of toll ® nancing, all
else being equal. The magnitude of this can be tested by applying the
model of state behaviour to smaller levels of government (for instance,
metropolitan areas or counties). The analysis suggests what might happen
if ® nancing responsibility and control over streets and roads were devolved
from states to counties or metro areas. We expect that counties, which
have a great deal of cross-jurisdictional ¯ ows, would be more likely to toll
than metro areas, or than the states which contain them. This section
hopes to establish the magnitude.
Journey to Work Trip tables using the public use microdata area
(PUMA) de® nition available from the Census PUMS database were
constructed for the state of California. PUMAs, of about 100,000 resi-
dents apiece, either coincide with counties, or aggregations of counties, or
can be aggregated to the level of a county. A new de® nition was created,
aggregated PUMA or APUMA, which was the larger of a PUMA or a
county. The APUMA is at a minimum one county, but may be comprised
of several small counties. The trip table, created with the PUMA de® ni-
tion, was further aggregated into the larger of the census metropolitan
statistical areas (MSA) or consolidated metropolitan statistical areas
(CMSA) for each place.
The previous section’s Model 2 was applied to each of the new geo-
graphical units (APUMA and MSA/CMSA). Bridges are not counted as
part of 1963 miles of toll road, so the eŒ ect of historical miles is zero for
each county and the state of California as a whole.
Table 3 shows the resulting share by area. Compared with California’s
toll share of 2.1 per cent, MSA/CMSAs had an average predicted share of
2.3 per cent and APUMAs of 10 per cent. However, metropolitan APU-
MAs, part of larger CMSAs, had much higher shares. By de® nition, very
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Share of Toll Revenue by Geographical Area
CMSA Share APUMA (Counties) Share
Bakers® eld 0.027 Kern 0.027
Chico 0.014 Butte 0.014
Fresno 0.025 Fresno 0.025





Merced 0.049 Merced 0.049
Modesto 0.057 Stanislaus 0.057
Redding 0.075 Shasta 0.075




Salinas 0.017 Monterey 0.017
San Diego 0 San Diego 0
San Francisco 0.011 Alameda 0.213
Contra Costa 0.208
Marin 0.222







Santa Barbara 0.028 Santa Barbara 0.028
Stockton 0.141 San Joaquin 0.141
Visalia 0.012 Tulare 0.012
Yuba 0.057 Sutter, Yuba 0.057
NonMetro 0.069 Del Norte, Lassen, Modoc, Siskiyou 0.107
Humboldt 0.061
Lake, Mendocino 0.066
Colusa, Glenn, Tehama, Trinity 0.198
Nevada, Plumas, Sierra 0.074
Alpine, Amador, Calaveras, Inyo,
Mariposa, Mono, Tuolumne,
Madera, San Benito 0.134
Kings 0.127
Imperial 0.000
San Luis Obispo 0.042
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between APUMAs within a larger metro area. Consequently, the share of
trips originating outside an area increases as the area gets smaller.
For instance, the Los Angeles metropolitan area, if treated as a whole
and given pricing authority over all its roads, was predicted to have a
share of toll revenue of 2.7 per cent. However, if the same analysis is
carried out with counties having that authority, the results diŒ er markedly.
The shares ranged from 4.8 per cent in Ventura County to 12.5 per cent in
Orange County. (Interestingly it is in Orange County that most of the new
toll road construction in California is taking place, on SR91 and the
Eastern Transportation Corridor.)
Similarly in San Francisco the metro area as a whole would have a
fairly low share of toll revenue (1.1 per cent), as most work trips remain
within the large area. But the toll share for individual counties would
range from 2.4 per cent in Santa Rosa to 34.5 per cent in the City of San
Francisco. The counties within the Bay Area have California’s highest
percentages of inter-county ¯ ows. It should be noted that with seven toll
bridges and several bottleneck passes, the Bay Area is probably most
easily adapted to increasing the share of toll revenue.
Application of Model 1 from the previous section, which included a
neighbour eŒ ect (N), is somewhat more complicated, especially since a
power term is used. The model would need to be applied iteratively or
simultaneously, since we are solving for the toll share of each geographical
units (APUMA, MSA/CMSA) depending on the toll share of all other
areas. If we use the estimated power term, the model ``blows up’’ at the
APUMA level, most jurisdictions go to 100 per cent toll share very
quickly. Toll shares were constrained to fall between 0 and 100 per cent.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper evaluated the empirical evidence surrounding the hypothesis
that jurisdictions’ highway ® nance behaviour is determined in part by the
share of non-local tra￿ c and by the behaviour of neighbouring jurisdic-
tions. It found that the greater the burden of ® nance that could be placed
on non-resident workers, the greater the burden that is placed on those
individuals. Similarly, it found corroborating evidence for a weak second-
order eŒ ect, when a jurisdiction responds to its neighbours’ policies. The
greater the toll share imposed by neighbours on a jurisdiction’s residents,
the greater the tolls that the jurisdiction will levy in response.
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or simply a rational non-cooperative outcome from states behaving e￿ -
ciently, depends on your point of view. This outcome has the potential for
internalising the congestion externality that a more ``cooperative’’ out-
come may lack. Only with the presence of tolls can marginal cost pricing
(or its variants of time-of-day or so-called value pricing) be implemented
and a more e￿ cient utilisation of congested highways achieved. The
smaller the jurisdiction, the greater the share of non-local tra￿ c, and thus
the higher incentive for tolls. This is especially true when looking at county
sized jurisdictions, such as those within California. Therefore, a way to
increase the likelihood of tolling is to decentralise the ® nancial responsi-
bility and governance of highways to more local agencies (for instance by
eliminating federal funding and moving authority from states to sub-
metropolitan areas and counties).
This potential could quickly turn sour in cases without congestion
(such as rural interstates), where the tolls may signi® cantly exceed the
marginal cost price. Decentralisation may also lead to misinvestment, as
jurisdictions have monopoly power and will be setting tolls and building
infrastructure with local pro® ts rather than global welfare in mind.
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